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BITS OR PAPER? COMPARING REMOTE ELECTRONIC
VOTING TO POSTAL VOTING
Robert Krimmer1, Melanie Volkamer2
In the recent years it has often been discussed how elections can be conducted via the Internet.
Many countries, including Germany, Estonia, Great Britain, Switzerland, USA or Austria have
run tests of implementing e-Voting on diﬀerent levels. Whilst oﬀering e-Voting for public elec-
tions implies various legal problems, associations can allow for e-Voting in a relatively easy way.
In this paper we investigate an election run by the leading German non governmental organi-
zation (NGO) in information technology – the Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik (GI) – that provided
for remote voting using postal voting and electronic voting via the Internet. It is a common
requirement by election oﬃcials for remote e-Voting to be as secure as regular postal voting. To
come up with an assessment the use of a criteria catalogue is best to compare these forms of
voting.
1 Introduction
With the rising use of the Internet and the transformation of paper based transaction processes
into electronic enabled online applications it was only a matter of time till the ﬁrst projects
thought of an electronic voting process. So in the recent years many organisations have thought
about such an application out of diﬀerent reasons3. One of the reasons has often been to raise
the participation rate of the electorate. In many cases the way to do so was introducing remote
voting either on paper (postal voting) or electronically (remote e-Voting). Both methods share
common problems like family voting but also have contradictory problems like securing the
anonymity.
As elections in general are processes developed over time and closely tied to a country’s or
organisation’s history, e-Voting projects vary a lot. As the development of applications for
support of the democratic processes is very demanding and costly, international best practices
and experiences are searched for intensively. Still due to the nature of democracy applications
they are very individual and therefore it is diﬃcult to compare them without taking certain
pre-conditions into account.
Whilst in the ﬁeld of e-government yearly benchmarks are organized by Cap Gemini [2], ﬁrst
comparative studies in the ﬁeld of e-democracy (i.e. including e-participation and e-Voting
research) have been conducted by Macintosh [3], Braun et.al. [4], and Kersting [5]. The most
comprehensive study on e-Voting in Europe has been organized by Leenes and Svenson [6].
All studies found that the context of the e-democracy applications inﬂuenced the way of imple-
mentation massively.
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In an eﬀort to develop a criteria catalogue for comparison of e-Voting projects the approach in
[7] is to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent preconditions that usually inﬂuence the way elections are
held. They diﬀerentiate them in four dimensions, i.e. (1) technology, (2) law, (3) politics and
(4) society.
Further more during the introduction of e-Voting legal regulations require remote e-Voting to
provide for the same level of security as any other form of remote voting, i.e. postal voting. In
order to assess these services for their level of security it is necessary to compare the speciﬁc
conditions and processes of the remote voting channels based on a criteria catalogue. So we
modiﬁed the previous mentioned catalogue to ﬁt our purposes of comparing two remote voting
channels in a practical experience. Further we chose the election of the Gesellschaft fu¨r Infor-
matik (GI)4. It is a perfect place to undertake such an investigation as it is a community of
technology-ﬁt users but share a critical point of view towards innovations in the information
science ﬁeld.
In this article we ﬁrst come up with common problems of remote elections and then introduce
the criteria catalogue. We continue with the case study of the GI election using the catalogue
and ﬁnally give an assessment towards the issues of remote elections.
2 Shared Problems and Risks of Remote Voting
As it is shown in [8] postal voting and remote electronic Voting are distance election forms and
so there are some common problems concerning the free and secret election principle. This
is because casting the vote does not take place in a secure environment like in a polling booth
positioned in a polling station but in a private environment. Therefore a local election committee
cannot ensure that a voter can cast her vote in secrecy. Similar problems arise in respect to the
free election principle due to problems like family voting, electoral enforcement and vote buying.
So now it is not the election committee but the voter who has to protect the election principals
of a free and secret election.
In [8], the authors compare the new remote electronic voting to the already existing postal voting
in regard to a security point of view. With the usage of postal voting, there exist diﬃculties in
respect to the secret, equal and universal election principals. The problem to ensure a secret
election arises from the fact that the voting material is sent to the election administration in
one envelope. So an attacker could catch the labelled letters on their way from the voter to
the election administration and open them. Further problems arise from the mail delivery time
whereby the equal and universal election principles may be at risk, but those are common postal
delivery problems.
Using a remote e-Voting system, the main problems concern the secret, free and universal elec-
tion principals and are due to the insecurity of the voter’s PC. We can think of several attacks
involving Trojan horses: One would be that the Trojan horse would send the cast ballot unen-
crypted from the voter’s PC to the attacker (violation against the secret election principal) or
the Trojan horse could change the ballot on the voter’s PC before it is sent it to the election
server (violation against the free election principal). All of this could be done without any fur-
ther input or notice of the computer user and done completely automatically. And at last the
universal election is endangered because of denial of service attacks.
4The Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik (GI) was set up in 1969 in Bonn as a registered association. Its intention is to
promote the computer science. The GI’s electoral laws are bound in the articles of association (see [9]-[11])
and the election reulations (see [12]). For the rest of this paper we will use the short cut.
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3 Criteria Catalogue
The comparison of e-Voting projects is very diﬃcult as they normally represent very individual
developments for the respective organisations or nations as it was shown in the cross-national
studies [3]-[6]. This criteria catalogue is a modiﬁed version of the second part from the one
available in [7], especially reﬁned to compare a traditional paper based remote voting channel to
a remote e-Voting channel. It consists of three parts: (1) a project overview, (2) the technology
used, and (3) the outcome of the project. So our main focus it the technology because law,
politics and society are the same for both types of elections.
In the following we will use this criteria catalogue to assess the use of postal and remote electronic
voting in the GI election 2004.
1                    Project Overview 2.2              Procedural Issues
1.1              General Project Description 2.2.1         Postal Voting Procedure
1.1.1 Form of Voting Used 2.2.1.1 Election Principles (Free, Equal)
1.1.2 Status 2.2.1.2 Kind of Identification
1.1.3 Duration 2.2.1.3 How to Guarantee Anonymity
1.1.4 Sustainability 2.2.1.4 Double Voting Protection
1.1.5 Location of Tests (Public/Private) 2.2.1.5 Protection against Ineligible Voters
1.1.6 Aim 2.2.1.6 Protection against Counting of Votes before End of Election
1.2              Resources 2.2.1.7 Identification of Fraud
1.2.1 Budget (amount, funds) 2.2.1.8 Possibility of Checks and Balances by Election Committee
1.2.2 Actors 2.2.2         Remote eVoting
1.2.2.1 Whose initiative 2.2.2.1 Election Principles (Free, Equal)
1.2.2.2 Level of Governmental/Organizational Support 2.2.2.2 Kind of Identification
1.2.2.3 Positions of Actors 2.2.2.3 How to Guarantee Anonymity
1.2.3.4 Scientific Background 2.2.2.4 Double Voting Protection
1.3              Scope 2.2.2.5 Protection against Ineligible Voters
1.3.1 Legal Validity 2.2.2.6 Protection against Counting of Votes before End of Election
1.3.2 Participants and Turnout 2.2.2.7 Identification of Fraud
1.4              Promotion 2.2.2.8 Possibility of Checks and Balances by Election Committee
2                    Technology 2.3              Security of Remote eVoting
2.1              General 2.3.1         Examination and Certification of System
2.1.1 Postal Voting 2.3.2         System Stability and Load Balancing
2.1.1.1 Process of Postal Voting 2.3.3         Organisational Surveillance of System
2.1.1.2 Failure Rates of Mail Delivery 2.3.4         Crisis Management Guidelines
2.1.1.3 Quality of Mail Addresses 2.3.5         Defense against DOS Attacks
2.1.2 Remote eVoting 2.3.6         Defense against Viruses, Trojan Horses
2.1.2.1 Hard- and Software Used 2.3.7         Protection against Spoofing, Man-in-the-middle-Attack, Security 
2.1.2.2 Developer and/or Provider 2.3.8         Organizational Measures against Access to the Servers
2.1.2.3 Forms of eVoting Used 2.4              Rules of Engagement
3                    Outcomes
3.1              Results of Evaluation
3.2              Other Outcomes
3.3              Critical Success Factors
3.4              Contentedness of the Voters
Table 1: Criteria catalogue to compare e-Voting with postal voting within a concrete example
4 The Case Study
In Germany in the current past, three associations applied an e-Voting system for legal binding
elections5. The most popular one and the one with the largest amount of voters, in December
2004, was the GI’s chairman election. They used the remote e-Voting and postal voting and so
it is a very good example for our case study. In the following we will apply the criteria catalogue
to compare the security of postal voting with the one of remote e-Voting6.
5The associations are the GI, the D21 [13] and the Digitale Bru¨cke [14].
6We used only material provided to the public either by web research or by reference from the GI or Micromata,
which can be found in the references [15] – [22].
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4.1 General Project Overview
4.1.1 General Description
The voters had the possibility either to use remote e-Voting form their own PCs or they could
use postal voting (type of project). The election was a pilot project7, but never the less it was
legal binding (see election information letter) (status of the project). Since the GI articles for
voting have been changed it is possible to use e-Voting for all GI elections. The main process to
oﬀer e-Voting as an additional voting channel in an election started in 2003. The management
board presented their request to the chairmen in January of 2004 and the chairmen agreed.
In autumn 2004 the chairmanship decided to use Micromata’s POLYAS system for the next
chairman election. Finally the POLYAS system was in operation from the 15th of October to
the 10th of December 2004 12.00 noon (duration of the project). Before the election, the election
committee explained that it is a pilot project and only its success will decide on its future use.
The election succeeded according to all participants and so it is planned to use it again for the
election in December 2005 (sustainability).
Before this legally binding election there was a test election (the 30th of September and the 6th of
October). 99 chosen GI members had the possibility to vote under the same conditions in order
to test the system. These members had the possibility to return feedback. The great amount of
suggestions of improvement had been realized and after that 10 of the 99 GI members had again
the possibility to test the improved system (location of tests). There were many factors why
the GI decided to apply e-Voting in their elections. First they write that they want to try new
technologies and innovative methods. Another aim was to dispel the security doubts against
electronic voting systems and the GI hoped to increase the voter turnout. Another reason to
apply e-voting was the quick election results and the fact that the GI can become a precursor
for other associations (aim of project).
4.1.2 Resources and Actors
In this part not many detail information is public available. The GI did not make any numbers on
budget or source of funding available to the public. The same holds for initiative, the actors/levels
of government and number of agencies involved as well as for scientiﬁcal support and evaluation,
pro and contra of actor and promotion.
In the chairman election there were 20.395 eligible voters. 4.845 members cast their votes elec-
tronically and 81 persons used postal voting. So the voter turnout has been 24,2% what means
that in comparison to the last chairman election in 2003 56% more GI members participated
the election in 2003 (participation and voter turnout).
4.2 Technology
4.2.1 Postal Voting
Every GI member got a letter with the election information, brieﬁngs to use the e-Voting system,
and the covered TAN code on the front. On the reverse side there was the information necessary
to request postal voting material. An additional paper informed the voter about the usage of
e-Voting in the GI. So if a voter preferred postal voting she had to ﬁll out the form on the reverse
side and send it back to the GI oﬃce (the postage was paid by the GI). In the next step the GI
7Pilot project meant that only if it works, e-Voting will become a standard solution for the future and if not,
e-Voting would be dropped in favour of solely a postal voting solution
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sent this voter the postal election records – a ballot, two special envelops, information about the
candidates, and an additional paper for the voter’s signature [12], then the user could cast her
candidates and sent it back to the GI oﬃce. (process of postal voting).
In Germany the mail delay for letters is very short especially for national mails: 95% letters
needs only one day and after two days 99% of all letters are delivered (Failure rates of mail
delivery). Even Europe-wide 97,1 % of the letters are delivered within 3 days.
The voter’s identiﬁcation attribute within the postal voting is the voter’s personal signature – as
usually with postal voting in Germany. To ensure a secret/anonymous election, the GI election
letters consists as usual out of two diﬀerent envelops: the main one which consists of a paper
with the voter’s personal signature and voter identiﬁcation attributes on it and a second envelop
with the ballot inside. So identity and closed ballot envelop are separated before opening the
ballot envelop. To exclude double voting the election record is only sent once to every voter,
also if the voter complains that she has not received it or in case she cannot ﬁnd it anymore. In
both cases – e-Voting and postal voting – there is no special protection against ineligible voters.
Many GI members use their oﬃce address and so they get the election records there which are
not as trustworthy as those at home, because everyone in the company has access to it (Family
voting becomes possible)8.
With respect to the protection against counting of votes before the end of the election and the
identiﬁcation of fraud the GI election committee consists of people with diﬀerent interests so
they control each other. Especially they check if no ballot letter has been opened before the end
of the election, because it cannot be closed again so it will be visible if some of the envelopes
have already been opened.
4.2.2 e-Voting
The voters can use almost all common browsers to cast their votes without Netscape 4.7.x9
and Lynx (Client Software). The infrastructure for the GI’s chairman election was provided
and advised by Micromata. The used severs were situated in a secure data processing service
center. The whole system is based on open source software like Linux, Apache, Tomcat, Open
SSL and Postgrep SQL, so it is possible to use the software in any environment (hardware and
software).
The e-Voting software POLYAS was developed by the company Micomata Objects GmbH, which
has its domicile in Kassel (Germany). The ﬁrst time POLYAS was used, was in 1996 in Finland.
Until now, about 250.000 voters cast their vote with this system (developer and provider).
The voter identiﬁcation and authentication is based on a PIN/TAN technique. The voter uses
as her PIN her membership number and her TAN is given her on the election records (under
a covered ﬁeld, so that no one else can read and use the TAN unnoticed). The TAN consisted
on 12 characters (6212 possibilities). The main idea to ensure an anonymous election is the
usage of pseudonyms. After the registration with a correct PIN/TAN combination, the electoral
server allocates the voter to an internal ID which is called ’election token’ and is later used to
identify the ballot. The token is a random generated character string that is sent back to the
voter (but not visible there) and in addition the election server sends it to the second election
server the so called box server (but no additional information about the voter’s identity). The
8Due to the nature of the identiﬁcation form in the used e-Voting software this is an issue aﬀecting both remote
e-Voting and postal voting.
9The electoral page was not presented correctly with Netscape 2.7.x but never the less the voter can cast her
vote with it.
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allocation from the internal ID to the GI membership number on the election server is deleted
immediately there and overwritten at the box server after the ﬁnal ballot casting and cannot
be reconstructed anymore. The only information bounded to the GI membership number at
the election server is the information that this member has cast her vote electronically and that
she is not allowed to cast again a ballot (double voting protection). Subsequently no allocation
from the voter to her ballot exists, even if the attacker knows both the data from the election
server and the box server. So on the one hand side the absolute separation from two servers
ensures a secret and anonymous election and on the other hand side the usage of SSL for the
communication between the two servers and the servers and the voter’s PC. In addition to that
Micromata has been committed to the German data protection principles.
With respect to protection against ineligible voters the diﬃculties are the same as with postal
voting because the election record with the TAN was sent via. The POLYAS system computes
continuously hash codes for the incoming ballots together with the already saved ones, so that
it is impossible to manipulate the ballots later on, unnoticed, because then there is a mistake in
the logical chain of the computed hash codes. In addition POLYAS provides the possibility to
print the ballots in order to count the ballots again (identiﬁcation of fraud).
The election committee is responsible for a correct election process but ﬁnally it has to trust
Micromata that everything works correctly, but with Micromata and the experts we do not have
people with diﬀerent interests like the people on the election committee so it is not obviously
that they control each other.
4.2.3 Security of e-Voting
The GI established a group of security experts to accompany the pilot election and the future
process of e-Voting in the GI. This group examined the system, including the source code, the
speciﬁcation, and the documentation. The recommendations were realized by Micromata. The
system has been checked in particular with regard to data protection and manipulations. The
group consists of German university professors who are national and international known for
their expertise in information security and for e-Voting and in addition e-Voting experts from
the PTB (Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt, Berlin): Prof. Dr. Brunnstein, Prof. Dr.
Grimm, Prof. Dr. Pﬁtzmann, Prof. Dr. Dieter Richter, PTB Berlin (examination, certiﬁcation
of the system).
Micromata uses redundant servers to improve the system stability. In addition Micromata
performed endurance testing (load balancing).
With respect to the organisational surveillance of system – watchdog we only know that the
server are situated in a secure data processing service centre. There is no information available
with respect to a crisis management as well as with respect to defence against DoS attacks,
viruses, and Trojan Horses as well as against Spooﬁng, Man-in-the-middle-attacks and security
leaks.
Access to the election servers is only possible for exclusive persons and in any case it is only
possible if at least two persons are present. In addition every access to the server is logged and
no other programs can change something according to the election software, databases or ballots
because POLYAS is the only software that runs on the servers (organizational measures against
access to the servers).
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4.2.4 Outcomes
There was no special evaluation after the election, but there was a forum on the GI’s web
pages where people could enter their opinion. Most of the comments are positive ones (result of
evaluation).
To the points other outcomes, critical success factors, and contentedness of the voters no infor-
mation is available beside the fact that a speaker of the GI said in an interview that the election
was successful and that no manipulation has been noticed.
5 Conclusion
In our analysis we assessed the level of security in remote e-Voting compared to postal voting in
a multi-channel election. To compare this we developed a criteria catalogue based on previous
comparative surveys in the ﬁeld of e-Voting. For our assessment we selected the pilot project by
the Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik (GI) who conducted a multi-channel election oﬀering solely re-
mote voting channels but both electronically (remote e-Voting) and paper based (postal voting).
This speciality made it very interesting to further investigate this project.
On one hand we showed that both channels share common problems in the ﬁeld of secrecy of
the vote in the vote casting stage is concerned. It also showed that the process of integrating
multiple channels of voting results in a much higher complexity basically on the back end but
not necessarily for the voter. In contrast the end users were very happy with the system which
was proven by a much higher participation rate.
Overall the system used by the GI is a simple solution to a typical problem of a registered
association and oﬀers valuable information and experiences for other projects in the ﬁeld of
e-Voting. Still it is questionable if such a system as used by the GI would incur more problems
in the ﬁeld of security issues when there would massive interest of hackers in manipulating the
election results. For primary elections as an election to the Bundestag one would have to use
a much more advanced system – at the current level of e-Voting technology probably a kiosk
system – to fully guarantee the legal election principles but one can deﬁnitely proﬁt from the
experiences made with the GI elections.
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